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Introduction 
This paper is a short overview of the research I have been carrying within my PhD 
project. I am looking for new approaches on how to conceive the ideal of national self-
determination in multiethnic communities in which different national groups are 
spatially intertwined and where there are no direct match between nation and 
territory. I claim that the current understanding of self-determination, as equivalent to 
political independence (or external self-determination), is not enough as a step toward 
the full emancipation of all the members of the community. I intend to explore 
alternative dimensions of self-determination so this concept can encompass a more 
inclusive, long-standing and dynamic understanding and sideline a whole set of 
contradictions which lay at its basis. 
I sought to avoid a merely political and institutional top-down approach on the 
protection of minorities, since these do not necessarily include social and economic 
dynamics which are central for the effective emancipation of individuals. Far from 
claiming that the political independence of a distinctive community is not an important 
element for its self-determination, I claim instead that a mere political approach to this 
concept might represent nothing more than the mere political control of a given 
territory by a new local elite; that would not add much to the daily lives of the 
population, even if they formally participate in political processes through regular 
elections.  
As to the protection of minorities, the Framework Convention on the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM, 1995), within the framework of the Council of Europe 
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(CoE), can be an interesting conventional starting point for my analysis, since it is the 
first (and the sole so far) international binding document specifically focused on 
minorities’ human rights. The monitoring system of the FCNM includes both state 
reports and NGO “shadow reports”, whose inputs are taken into account when the 
CoE Committee of Ministers drafts its Resolution on the periodic monitoring cycles. 
In a first section, I will elaborate a little more on my argument and how I came to 
question the current practice of self-determination as political independence. The 
second section will be centered on the CoE and the building up of a European set of 
conventions, protocols and standard on human rights. Finally, the last section will 
explore the dialogue between the Republic of Macedonia, the Advisory Committee of 
the Framework-Convention (ACFC) and the local NGOs, as a platform where these 
different actors can interact in a horizontal and constructive manner. 
 
National groups looking for some form of self-determination 
Political independence as a sovereign state has been for decades the ultimate form of 
self-determination for national communities. This has been the main political principle 
behind the whole process of decolonization after World War II (WWII), but also the 
driving force behind some other non-colonial struggles in which a specific community 
aims at its self-determination from a broader community, based on ethnic grounds. 
One can acknowledge that the self-determination of former colonies is rather clear-
cut: the anti-colonial struggle was conducted against imperial powers which 
illegitimately kept their domination on overseas territories, populations and resources. 
The potentially problematic drawing of borders was easily put aside as the principle of 
uti possidetis3 was commonly adopted between the new post-colonial states. 
But claims for self-determination in non-colonial contexts can be more problematic. 
The political independence of a new state is dependent on the recognition from the 
remaining international community (Cassese, 1995). Given that the rules, procedures 
and criteria for statehood are defined by inherently conservative actors (the states), 
there is not much room for the emergence of new states. Actually, except for the 
decolonization process and the dissolution of some federal states (the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), among the many movements for political 
independence since 1945, there were only two successful secession processes: 
                                                          
3 The new states would keep the international borders defined under the colonial regimes, so as to 
avoid potentially dilacerating and never-ending disputes. 
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Bangladesh and South Sudan4. Common rules of international law, such as the 
territorial integrity/inviolability of borders and the non-interference in domestic issues, 
support an overall stance on the existent status quo. Secession would be accepted only 
as a last resort, remedial solution.  
Other more practical factors can also be obstacles for a universal application of the 
principle of self-determination of peoples. First, there are economic constraints such as 
the economic viability of the new state-to-be or its dependence on international 
support. Second, geopolitical factors behind the support/non-support of the 
international community or the presence/absence of a relevant international sponsor 
to a specific secessionist attempt can be decisive for the final outcome of a secessionist 
movement. Third, territories are hardly ethnically homogenous; drawing new 
international borders based on idealized national territories is denied as there is no 
direct match between “nation” and “territory”, as distinct populations are 
disseminated within that given territory. As a consequence of this mismatch, claims for 
self-determination based on ethnic grounds may lead to the creation of new forms of 
exclusion on the minorities remaining in the new state, either they were already 
minorities or not.  
I started this section by stating that “political independence as a sovereign state has 
been for decades the ultimate form of self-determination for national communities”. 
But what happens to communities which are denied political independence as the 
ultimate from of their self-determination? Would they thus be incomplete nations, 
compared to the ones that achieve statehood? Wouldn’t it create categories of 
nations: the ones achieving statehood, the ones seeking statehood, and the ones whose 
statehood is denied? Is it correct to assume that political independence is the final 
stage of the self-determination process of a community? Is there anything beyond that 
stage that would allow a deeper understanding of self-determination? How to conceive 
the ideal self-determination of the peoples in multiethnic societies and how to assess 
an effective and inclusive participation of the whole population, regardless of their 
ethnic belonging and geographic location?  
All this questioning leads us into considering whether self-determination as a dynamic 
process of emancipation of a specific community is actually fulfilled with political 
independence. My point would be that, as important as it can be for the self-
                                                          
4 I do not include East Timor in such a list of “secessions”: it became independent from Indonesia in 
2002, which invaded the territory when it still was a Portuguese colony; the latter formed a post-
colonial federation with Ethiopia which split in 1993.  
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determination of a specific community, statehood does not bring automatically 
emancipation to the whole population within the new state. I do not claim that 
statehood is not important in the way to the self-determination of a community, but 
that it is not sufficient by itself in that emancipation move. Therefore, statehood is not 
an end in itself, but a means to self-determination as emancipation. Besides, it is 
excessively linked to the political control of a given territory by a previously excluded 
elite, since the mission of nationalist movements fades out as the nation achieves 
statehood. On the one hand, this approach on self-determination also ignores 
important social and economic factors in the shaping of an effectively emancipated 
community. On the other hand, since this new state legitimizes itself by claiming a 
specific ethnic background against the hegemony of a dominating community, this 
means that the smaller communities within it will not be a constitutive part of it and 
may become (or remain) new oppressed communities which can potentially claim for a 
state of their own. Thus national self-determination solely based on the political 
independence of each ethnic identity in a given territory may lead to the reproduction 
of some kind of ethnic hegemony, in a never ending secessionist discourse in an 
increasingly minor scale. 
Having this in mind, I consider that a new approach to understand self-determination is 
required in order to assess the effective emancipation of all individuals in a given 
territory, regardless of their ethnic background. This understanding would require not 
only non-discrimination on ethnic grounds, but also the inclusion of ethnic minorities 
in every relevant political, social and economic dimension of the state. My analysis will 
not focus only on the protection of minorities, but rather on their participation. 
 
A state of the art of the protection on minorities’ human rights: the novelty 
of the FCNM 
Within the European legal framework on the protection of human rights under the 
CoE, a rather individual approach was endorsed, the same way the UN system was. Its 
major legal outcome, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR, 1950), was essentially aimed at protecting individuals, no matter 
their national status or background. Actually, the only reference to “national 
minorities” in this Convention is included in Article 14 on the prohibition of 
discrimination. Any provision on the protection of national groups as such would not 
fit in its jurisdiction.  
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The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and of the Yugoslav 
Federation opened a new era in the understanding of human rights. On the one hand, 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, forcible displacements and other massive violations of 
human rights in former Yugoslavia highlighted a very fragile state of the art on 
international binding documents aiming at protecting entire populations living as 
structural minorities in a hostile state. On the other hand, the existing references to 
non-discrimination of national minorities in international covenants did not prevent 
systematic exclusion from the political, economical and social environment where they 
lived. Some important reflections started to be drafted within the scope of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), such as in the Document 
of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. 
In 1995 the CoE launched a Framework-Convention on the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM), the first legally binding international text specifically focused on the 
minorities’ human rights (Hoffman, 2005). After it came into force in 1998, all 
members of the CoE have gradually signed the document, except Andorra, France, 
Monaco and Turkey to this date.5 Some of it features must be stressed. First, although 
within the scope of the CoE, the FCNM has not been adopted as an additional 
Protocol to the ECHR, as it could have been (Weller, 2005). Thus its ratification is 
optional and it is not covered by the judicial control of the European Court of Human 
Rights (Kicker and Möstl, 2012). Second, it is a “Framework-Convention”, not a 
Convention, meaning that its content is not rigid on how to be implemented and 
allows the member states some flexibility on their action (Steketee, 2001). Third, the 
FCNM does not provide a definition for “national minorities” (Alfredsson, 2000); this 
was a pragmatic decision for this definition could have led to never-ending discussions 
and potentially block the whole document (Steketee, 2001). Thus it is up to each of 
the members states to define which human groups within their borders can be 
considered “minorities”, or whether only “old” minorities, or both “old” and “new”6 
minorities can fit the concept (Hoffman, 2005). 
Since the content of the FCNM can be understood as a set of loose guidelines (Weller 
2005) on the protection of minorities and the resort to judicial mechanisms is not 
possible, the proper evaluation of the implementation of the FCNM took the form of a 
monitoring system based on states reports assessed by the Advisory Committee of the 
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6 The “new” minorities are the communities constituted through recent immigration. 
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Framework-Convention (ACFC) in close cooperation with the CoE Committe of 
Ministers (CM). It is an independent organ insofar as its members are 18 experts on 
minorities’ rights elected from a short list suggested by the member states. The ACFC 
has a pivotal role in the whole monitoring process, since it outlines the rules on how 
the State Reports have to be drafted for each monitoring cycle; its Opinions on these 
State Reports are the backbone of the Resolutions the CoE Committee of Ministers 
issues on each state at the end of each monitoring cycle; and the experience 
accumulated by its experts allows the ACFC to elaborate Thematic Commentaries on 
specific issues.7 
Each monitoring cycle has an approximate time span of five years, from the moment 
the rules for State Reports are set up, to the final CM Resolution on each specific 
country. The ACFC is responsible for receiving the State Reports and for issuing an 
Opinion on them, using information from other sources such as NGOs shadow 
reports; the Committee can also visit the state and meet with governmental agents, 
members of the Parliament, representatives of minorities, local NGOs and experts in 
the field of human rights (Steketee, 2001). After receiving the ACFC Opinion on their 
State Report, the state can draft a Comment and engage in a direct dialogue with the 
ACFC. Finally, the political element of the monitoring cycle is introduced at the 
moment the CM launches its Resolution on the situation of minorities’ rights in each 
country; so far the content of these Resolution have been very close to the content of 
the ACFC Opinion, which is a clear evidence of the trust and the complementarity 
between this political body and the experts body (Hoffman, 2005; Beco and 
Lantschner, 2012). 
 
Monitoring the application of the FCNM – The case of the Republic of 
Macedonia 
My case study will be the Republic of Macedonia8, a state in which minorities sum up 
more than 30% of the total population. The Albanian community is the largest minority 
in this state, around 25% of the population according to the last census in 2002; the 
remaining communities (Turks, Serbs, Romas, Bosniaks and Vlachs) are significantly 
                                                          
7 So far, three Thematic Commentaries have been issued: on education (2006), on participation in 
cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs (2008) and on language rights (2012). 
8 I acknowledge the pending issue of the constitutional name of Macedonia (a member of the UN under 
the name of the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM) which is still contended by Greece. 
The use of “Republic of Macedonia” in this paper shall not be seen as a political siding from the author. 
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smaller, each of them being less than 4% of the population. The tension between the 
Macedonian authorities and the Albanian population has been present in the domestic 
political debate since the independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Although inter-ethnic 
violence has never led to a large scale war as in other former Yugoslav republics and 
although Albanian parties have been part of the governing coalitions ever since, the 
relations between ethnic Macedonian and Albanian have always been marked by 
distrust and sharp divisions.  
The violent uprisings in Western Macedonia between Albanian armed groups and the 
Macedonian authorities in 2001 and the following Ohrid Framework Agreement 
constitute a turning point in the position of the Albanian population within the 
Macedonian state (Spaskovska, 2010). First, the Albanian language became an official 
national language, as a language representing at least 20% of the population; this 
threshold was also adopted at the local level, with varying results according to the 
ethnic balance in each municipality. Second, the Preamble of the Constitution was 
rephrased in order to put the different communities on a more equal footing, as the 
1991 Constitution put a stronger emphasis on the Macedonian people as the core of 
the Republic. Third, a double majority rule was adopted in the Parliament for decisions 
in sensitive issues; this double majority implies a majority of the members of the 
Parliament and a majority of the members of the Parliament belonging to minorities. 
Fourth, a decentralization program was set in order to attribute extended powers to 
the municipalities towards a more effective local self-government, along with a 
redrawing of municipal borders and territorial reorganization (Friedman, 2009). Fifth, a 
set of legislation on equitable representation of the different ethnic communities in the 
public administration and in the police force was planned. Finally, higher education was 
extended to languages other than Macedonian; the threshold was also 20%, which 
allowed the existing Albanian University of Tetovo to be officially recognized.  
Some of the major claims of the Albanian community since 1991 were accepted under 
this Agreement (Bieber, 2005) and their gradual implementation is ubiquitous when 
one evaluates the current status of the minorities in Macedonia. Nonetheless, the 
inclusive participation of ethnic minorities (either the Albanian or the others) did not 
improve overnight, and although the constitutional/legal changes achieved after 2001 
were significant, their practical effects are not so clear. These events were determinant 
in the shaping of the inter-ethnic relations in the Republic of Macedonia and the 
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monitoring dialogue on the implementation of the FCNM, which coincidently started 
after 2001, was also greatly influenced.  
The first round of monitoring in the Republic of Macedonia (2003-2005) started in 
2003 when the first State Report was sent to the ACFC, four years after its due 
deadline in 1999. Following the guidelines provided by the ACFC on its outline, the 
report had extensive statistical data and political, economic and social indicators which 
would underline the distinctive living conditions between the different Macedonian 
communities. A second part of the report was structured upon the text of the FCNM, 
by matching its articles one by one to the legal and constitutional framework of the 
Republic of Macedonia. As accurate as this report outline can be, this solely 
quantitative and descriptive analysis based on the Constitution and the common 
national law lacks a deeper and more explanatory report which would have been more 
helpful in assessing the proper application of the FCNM. This, however, has been 
reverted in the following two rounds of monitoring, in which more dynamic guidelines 
have been provided to the national institutions responsible for producing the report.  
In their Opinion to the first State Report (2005), the experts of the ACFC 
acknowledged the recent improvements made in the constitutional and legal 
framework of the Republic of Macedonia regarding the protection and participation of 
minorities and stressed the need to proceed with reforms in some key areas such as 
the political decentralization process and the use of minorities languages and alphabet 
in official documents. On the other hand, they also pointed to the fact that the armed 
conflict in 2001 is barely referred in the report and that representatives of the 
minorities have not been consulted in its elaboration. Moreover, some structural 
problems did persist and the effective implementation of the legal changes was 
somehow delayed.  
The reaction of the Macedonian Government in its Commentary on the ACFC 
Opinion (2005) was almost harsh, stating that the Macedonian legislation on minorities 
went beyond the standards expected, implying that the evaluation of the ACFC was 
stepping ahead of its own function. However, the dialogue between the ACFC and the 
Government became easier during the two following rounds of monitoring (2006-2009 
and 2010-2012) and the dialogue with the experts made possible. First, since the 
FCNM and its monitoring system are fairly recent, adjustments to its practices were 
made in order to rectify identified flaws in the process (Kicker and Möstl, 2012). 
Second, the Macedonian Government itself adopted a more collaborative attitude 
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towards its commitments to the FCNM. On the one hand, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (the official body responsible for the monitoring process) called for the 
participation of local NGOs for elaborating the State Reports before they were 
officially sent to the ACFC. On the other hand, the Government sponsored the 
organization of seminars on the implementation of the FCNM between each round of 
monitoring, with the purpose of evaluating the finishing round and preparing the 
forthcoming one. 
This more collaborative and dynamic approach has proven to be more fruitful since the 
dialogue between the Macedonian institutions, the local NGOs and the ACFC provides 
a more precise account on the living conditions of the minorities and on the further 
steps to be taken. Some of the most persistent negative aspects can be traced thanks 
to this more dialectic approach and which would have been much more limited with a 
mere description of the existing legislation, I will point to just a few. First, although 
education in the minorities’ languages in the primary and secondary levels is legally 
possible and bilingual schools actually exist, many obstacles on the effective 
implementation of the education system remains. Pedagogical material is not sufficient; 
transport from remote areas to schools teaching minority languages may also lack; 
trained teachers are not sufficient either, since higher education in languages other 
than Macedonian was not an option, not a long time ago. Second, even though 
employment in public institutions has increased consistently, a significant part of these 
employees were hired in order only to artificially comply with the legislation on 
minorities’ quotas and do not have proper functions or defined tasks in their jobs. This 
seems consistent with the fact that since independence, Albanian parties have always 
been part of the governing coalitions, but often with non-decisive positions or as mere 
deputies with no access to relevant information or to the actual decision-making 
process (XXX). Third, even though a Committee on the Relations between Ethnic 
Communities exists in the national Parliament as an advisory body and a mediator 
between the ethnic communities which assists the legislative process in sensitive issues; 
a similar mechanism has been conceived for municipalities in which a given minority 
represents more than 20% of the population. Nevertheless, this committee has had a 
very limited role so far and has been somehow sidelined by the Government itself in 
its task of consensus maker. 
Within this mechanism of State reports and AFCF Opinions leading to the CM final 
Resolution based, the NGOs could have had a more direct input in the whole process, 
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through the possibility of preparing NGO Shadow Reports, as a complement to the 
State Reports. Any local NGO can elaborate its own Shadow Report and send it to 
the ACFC as an additional element for discussion. In the case of the Republic of 
Macedonia, three Shadow Reports have been issued and published in the ACFC official 
website: the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in the Republic of Macedonia 
(1999), the Association for Democratic Initiatives (2001) and the Working Group for 
Minorities Issues (2004). The third one could have been an important starting point to 
a direct dialogue between the information provided by the State and the information 
provided by local NGOs, but there is no record of further NGO Shadow Reports 
after 2004.  
Although relevant in the information they provide, they have been rather useless in the 
whole monitoring system they were meant for, since the first two of them have been 
written even before the first State Report has been sent to the ACFC. Besides, their 
quality is highly variable, if we compare the content of each one of them, not only their 
distinct structures and focus but also because deficient translation in some of them 
impedes a clear understanding of the text. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Assessing whether of a state policy complies with the FCNM cannot be done only by 
the mere fulfillment of a formatted checklist of legal and constitutional steps. As 
important as these steps can be, this compliance depends also on their effective 
implementation and on the way they can have a positive impact in people’s everyday 
lives. In the specific case of the Republic of Macedonia, an evolution of the monitoring 
mechanism towards a more dynamic and dialectic relation with the ACFC proved that 
despite some significant improvements, being part of an ethnic minority is still a source 
of exclusion in several dimensions of one’s life, falling short of the purpose of the 
FCNM. This more dynamic move enabled the ACFC to persistently point to some 
structural shortcomings in the Republic of Macedonia. For instance, though the 20% 
rule for recognizing language rights following the Ohrid Agreement was important in 
guaranteeing the rights of the Albanian population in acceding to the education system 
and being locally empowered, the strict application of this threshold had actually 
excluded most of the smaller communities. Consequently, the political debate has 
become polarized between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian community; the 
remaining communities which constitute about 10% of the population of the Republic 
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is still systematically sidelined, although there is legislation aimed at protecting 
communities representing less than 20% of the population. But above all, even if the 
different communities share the same physical environment, they live parallel 
existences without much inter-ethnic contacts or social and economic cohesion. This 
is particularly visible in education, in the media and in the party system.  
I have tried to explore the possibility of looking into the participation of local 
organization as relevant actors for the inclusion of minorities through the monitoring 
system of the FCNM. Although these have gradually been active participants in the 
whole monitoring process and although the AFCF experts have met many NGOs 
during their visits to the Republic of Macedonia, the possibility of elaborating shadow 
reports has not been extensively used. I consider that, along with the dialogue with the 
national authorities and the ACFC, a continuous process of producing these shadow 
reports might have added a valuable input to the overall monitoring system. Whether 
the discontinuity of these shadow reports was caused by a renunciation of the ACFC 
to ask for them, or caused by the lack of means/will of the local organizations, is an 
avenue for a new deepening in my research. 
Another aspect impeding a proper analysis of the current situation of minorities in the 
Republic of Macedonia is the fact that the last census has been carried in 2002. The 
procedures for carrying a new census in 2011 was interrupted and never reset ever 
since. Considering that the 1991 census was boycotted by the Albanian parties (and  
repeated in 1994) and that the 2002 census became a reality only after massive political 
pressure from the international community, realistic statistical data are missing both 
for assessment of implemented policies and for the implementation of new ones.  
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